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BETTING ON HITLER—THE VALUE OF POLITICAL
CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY*
THOMAS FERGUSON AND HANS-JOACHIM VOTH
This paper examines the value of connections between German industry and
the Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporary
sources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns,
we ﬁnd that one out of seven ﬁrms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies,
had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers’ Party. Firms
supportingtheNazimovementexperiencedunusuallyhighreturns,outperforming
unconnected ones by 5% to 8% between January and March 1933. These results
are not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimators
and deﬁnitions of afﬁliation.
I. INTRODUCTION
From Indonesia and Malaysia to Italy, politically connected
ﬁrms are more valuable than their less fortunate competitors.1
Yet a key event in the history of the twentieth century has not
been examined in terms of the value of political connections—the
Nazi rise to power. We systematically assess the value of prior
ties with the new regime in 1933. To do so, we combine two new
data series: A new series of monthly stock prices, collected from
ofﬁcial publications of the Berlin stock exchange, and a second
series that uses hitherto unused contemporary data sources, in
combination with previous scholarship, to pin down ties between
big business and the Nazis. We consider both active managers
(theVorstand)andsupervisoryboardmembers(Aufsichtsrat).Our
data reveal that many more large ﬁrms had ties with the National
Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) than suggested by ear-
lier scholarship—to the extent that weighted by capitalization in
1932, more than half of listed ﬁrms on the Berlin stock exchange
enjoyed close links with the Nazi movement.
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These two new data sets allow us to examine the reaction of
investors to the Nazi “seizure of power.” If close ties with the new
government—as perceived by German stock market investors in
1933—were valuable to the ﬁrms in question, their share prices
shouldhaveoutperformedtherestofthemarket.Wethustrytoof-
fer a quantitative answer to the question, How much was it worth
to have close, early connections with the Nazi party? The answer
is—a great deal. Afﬁliated ﬁrms outperformed the stock market
by 5% to 8% and account for a large part of the market’s rise.
Investors recognized value where they saw it and rewarded ﬁrms
with preestablished ties handsomely. This demonstrates that the
connections we document mattered—investors’ willingness to pay
for connected ﬁrms was markedly higher by mid-March 1933 than
before the thirtieth of January.
Our results relate to an earlier literature that focused on
the connections between big business and the NSDAP during the
Great Depression. Following the conviction of inﬂuential indus-
trialists such as Friedrich Karl Flick, Alfried Krupp, and I. G.
Farben executives in the Nuremberg trials, much of the literature
took it for granted that major German ﬁrms had ﬁnanced the Nazi
party’s rapid rise after 1930. Autobiographies of leading ﬁgures
suchasFritzThyssen’sIPaidHitler(1941)reinforcedthisimpres-
sion.2 From the late 1960s onward, this consensus was challenged
by Henry A. Turner. His German Big Business and the Rise of
Hitler argued that before 1933, contributions from large corpo-
rations were rare. Only a handful of prominent business lead-
ers had made substantial donations. The party was largely self-
ﬁnancing. Political contributions were a way to hedge bets, and
many right-wing parties received funding.3 There was no “smok-
ing gun” linking big business with the rise of Hitler. Although
some authors have questioned Turner’s reading of the evidence,
the consensus now is that the links between big business and the
Nazis were much more tenuous and ambiguous than previously
assumed.4
2. Heiden (1944); testimony from senior Weimar ofﬁcials who had ﬂed the
country, prominent foreign diplomats, and reports from foreign journalists only
strengthened that impression. See, for example, Br¨ uning (1970) or Dodd and Dodd
(1941).
3. Turner (1985) is the classic treatment. Studies by Hayes (1987) and Mollin
(1988) provided inﬂuential early support, as has subsequent work by Feldman
(2004) and James (2004a).
4. Criticisms of earlier essays by Turner are in Stegmann (1973, 1977); of the
book, in Abraham (1986) and Conze (2005). For one version of a consensus, see, for
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Our ﬁndings relate to two other literatures as well. Recent
work on Indonesia and Malaysia has analyzed the value of polit-
ical connections in developing countries using event-study meth-
ods in the context of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis. It offered a
natural experiment to test the value of Suharto’s patronage in
Indonesia (Fisman 2001) and by Mahathir or Anwar in Malaysia
(JohnsonandMitton2003).Jayachandran (2006)foundthatwhen
Senator Jeffords switched party afﬁliation, losing the Republi-
cans their majority, ﬁrms that had made substantial soft-dollar
donations lost in value. Knight (2007) examined stock market re-
sponses to the changing election prospects of Bush vs. Gore in
the run-up to the 2000 election. He argued that policy platforms
of Presidential contenders are priced into equities, with, for ex-
ample, tobacco ﬁrms being worth 13% more under a favorable
Bush administration than under Gore.5 Recent work has empha-
sizedcross-countrycomparisons(Faccio2006;Faccio,Masulis,and
McConnell 2006).6 Faccio (2006) shows that political connections
around the globe are more valuable in corrupt countries with bar-
riers to foreign investment and weak institutions.
In the studies of Indonesia and Malaysia, many afﬁliations
were either predetermined by family ties or had existed for a long
time. Faccio emphasized ties that arise when businessmen enter
politics. The type of connections we document are different be-
cause they are formed deliberately, and not by genetic roulette. In
this regard, they are more similar to the contributions in United
States elections traced in Jayachandran (2006). Their value is
tested in the context of an extreme shift in power. Recent lit-
erature has analyzed contributions to parties and political cam-
paigns, arguing that these are similar to investment opportuni-
ties. Scholars have documented that politicians in key positions
such as committee chairs in Congress receive greater contribu-
tions (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1999; Grier and Munger 1991).
Also, the contributions of political action committees run by ﬁrms
and industry associations are tied to the likelihood of a politician
succeeding in his bid for ofﬁce, whereas individual contributions
may not be (Snyder 1990). Despite the evidence that money talks
in politics, controversy continues about the process of price forma-
tion. Returns on contributions often appear to be exorbitant: Some
5. Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007) show that U.S. stock indices re-
acted strongly to the ﬂawed exit poll data during 2004 U.S. presidential election.
6. There is also a related literature that examines the response of asset mar-
kets to the risk of war. Cf. for example Frey and Kucher (2000).104 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
analysts, following Tullock (1972), suggest that because switching
a single vote with limited contributions may generate windfalls
worth millions, even more money should ﬁnd its way into politics.7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II offers
a brief summary of the NSDAP’s rise to power and argues that a
look at the cross-sectional evidence is necessary to shed further
light on the stock exchange’s reaction to the rise of the Nazi party.
Section III describes our data on stock prices and connected ﬁrms.
We present our main results in Section IV and discuss interpreta-
tionsofourﬁndings.Thenextsectionlooksatissuesofrobustness.
We then consider how associations were formed and potential en-
dogeneity problems in Section VI. The conclusion discusses the
paper’s main implications and compares the size of effects with
that of those found during other regime changes.
II. THE NSDAP’S RISE TO POWER
In November 1923, the National Socialist German Workers
Party staged an unsuccessful putsch in Munich. Key ﬁgures, in-
cluding Adolf Hitler himself, were imprisoned. Thereafter, the
party pursued a strategy of legitimacy, attempting to gain power
through the electoral process. For most of the 1920s, its chances
of doing so seemed slim. In 1928, membership exceeded 100,000,
but the party polled a disappointing 2.6% of all votes in national
elections. In the spring of 1930, however, the last coalition with a
parliamentary majority fell apart over the Reich’s budget deﬁcit
and increased unemployment contributions. Afterward, minority
governments largely relied on the President’s special powers to
push through legislation.
As the economic crisis deepened, the NSDAP gained its ﬁrst
major success in the national elections of 1930, polling 18% and
gaining the second-largest number of seats in parliament. The
party’s membership soared, reaching 800,000 by 1931. In the
spring of 1932, the Br¨ uning government fell (Table I). President
Hindenburg appointed another minority cabinet, headed by Franz
vonPapen.Inthesummerelectionof1932,theNazipartyreceived
37% of all votes, winning the largest number of delegates in the
7. For example, Ansolabehere, de Figueireido, and Snyder (2003) argue that
some $200,000 in contributions by the sugar industry produced a windfall of $1.1
billion per year for the industry; they also argue that U.S. political contributions
have been ﬂat in real terms throughout the twentieth century. Cf. the Internet
version of Ferguson (2005) for a skeptical assessment.POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 105
TABLE I
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS
1932 May 30 Chancellor Br¨ uning steps down
July 31 National elections (NSDAP wins 230 seats)
August 13 Hitler and von Papen visit President Hindenburg;
Hitler declines offer of Vice-Chancellorship
November 6 National elections (NSDAP seats decline from 230
to 196)
December 2 General von Schleicher appointed Chancellor
1933 January 4 Meeting of von Papen and Hitler in the house of von
Schr¨ oder in Cologne
January 30 Hitler appointed Chancellor
February 27 Reichstag ﬁre
March 5 National elections (NSDAP obtain 288 of 647 seats)
March 23 Enabling law (legislation can be enacted without
constitutional constraints)
April 1 Nationwide boycott of Jewish-owned stores starts
May 2 Unions dissolved
Reichstag. Because Hitler insisted on becoming Chancellor, the
NSDAP did not enter into government. Elections in November
1932 brought the ﬁrst major setback for the Nazis, as their vote
slipped and they lost 34 seats. After von Papen stepped down as
Chancellor, Hindenburg brieﬂy appointed General von Schleicher
in his place. Von Schleicher was unable to widen his political sup-
port and had to resign. Promising a broad coalition of the right,
Hitler was appointed as head of government by the President on
January 30, 1933.
Apart from Hitler himself, the new cabinet contained only
two Nazi ministers. Hermann G¨ oring also held the crucial post
of Prussian Minister of the Interior, which gave the NSDAP con-
trol over the biggest German state’s police. The German National
People’s Party (DNVP), some technocrats, and other independent
ﬁguresoftherightﬁlledkeypositions.Withindaysoftakingofﬁce,
the new government announced new parliamentary elections for
early March. Using the pretext of the Reichstag ﬁre, the new gov-
ernment cracked down on the Communist party and suspended
civil liberties.
The March elections gave the NSDAP 44% of the vote. With
its “National” coalition partners, the government commanded an
absolute majority. The enabling law, passed with the votes of all
parties except the Social Democrats, changed the constitution and
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April, a nationally orchestrated boycott of Jewish stores began,
and the civil service was purged of Jews and Social Democrats.8
The unions were dissolved in early May, and numerous members
jailed. By the summer of 1933, all parties except the NSDAP had
been dissolved.
Earlier examinations of the link between stock prices and
the Nazis’ rise to power focused on market averages. Immediately
after the new government took ofﬁce, stocks rallied. As the New
York Times’s correspondent put it on January 31: “The Boerse
recovered today from its weakness yesterday when it learned of
Adolf Hitler’s appointment, an outright boom extending over the
greaterpartofthestocks...Theturnoverwaslarge,leadingstocks
advancing 3 to 5 percent.”9 Stock prices continued to rise after
January 1933.10 Some observers argued that investor enthusiasm
for Nazi economic policies and rearmament was responsible for
this increase.
The consensus view has been that this evidence is not con-
vincing, for two reasons. First, the rebound in stock prices began
long before Hitler’s accession to ofﬁce became a serious political
possibility. Second, it is also virtually indistinguishable from the
cyclical increase in broad market indices that started in most in-
dustrialized countries in the summer of 1932. Figure I plots stock
indices in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United
States. The German market fell by 40% between January 1930
and April 1932. By mid-January 1933, it had risen by 43%. This
was part of a general trend—the Standard and Poor’s 500 in the
United States had gained 35% over the same period. Nor were the
increases after the thirtieth of January 1933 unusually high. By
June, the German index had risen by 12% since mid-January. The
S&P was up 63%, the U.K. FTSE 11%, and the French index 10%.
As Figure I shows, there is little to suggest that stock market in-
vestors as a whole cheered the Nazis’ rise to power to a signiﬁcant
extent, at least during its initial phase. What has been neglected
is the impact of Hitler’s accession to power on the cross section of
stock returns.
8. The party had a long history of extralegal violence against its enemies; the
degree of central coordination was new. Cf. Bessel (2004).
9. New York Times, Feb. 1, 1933, p. 29.
10. News reports from the Berlin bourse often refer to positive reactions to
Nazi policies (such as large increases in stock prices for automobile manufactur-
ers after a speech by Hitler at the automobile show in February 1933), but also
describe unease at the prospect of fresh elections and possible deadlock in the new
government. Cf. New York Times, Feb. 12, 1933, p. 47 and Feb. 13, p. C23.POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 107
FIGURE I
Stock Market Indices, January 1930–December 1933, United Kingdom,
Germany, United States, and France
III. NEW DATA SETS ON STOCK MARKET RETURNS AND NATIONAL
SOCIALIST AFFILIATION
III.A. Stock Prices, Dividends, and Market Value
Stock prices of individual shares are from the Berlin stock
exchange’s ofﬁcial price lists (Monats-Kursblatt). Germany had
(and still has) numerous exchanges, with local bourses competing
for listings. The Berlin Bourse became the dominant one by the
late nineteenth century and retained its position until 1945.11
Some potentially interesting ﬁrms, including several from the
Ruhr industrial district, are not included in our study. We be-
gin in April 1932, when the stock exchanges reopened after the
ﬁnancial crisis of the summer/autumn of 1931. There are 751
ﬁrms in our data set, with quotations for 789 securities during
the period April 1932 to May 1933 (Table II). Many observations
are missing—trading, especially in the smaller stocks, was often
illiquid, and some stocks were delisted. A few ﬁrms had more
than one security quoted, in almost all cases preferred shares.
We include these separately but cluster standard errors at the












Mean dividend yield 0.034 0.029
Proportion of ﬁrms with
zero dividend
0.65 0.52
Mean log return November 32–January 33 0.12 0.10
January 33–March 33 0.072 0.002
N 119 (81) 670 (381)
Sample size for ﬁrms with capitalization ﬁgures in parentheses.
ﬁrm level to avoid understating them. We collected price informa-
tion for the tenth of each month, or the nearest trading day.12 The
price list also gives information on dividend payments by ﬁnancial
year.
The 1932 edition of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften contains information on capital structure (number
and type of shares outstanding).13 Market capitalization was cal-
culated as the total number of ordinary share equivalents times
the share price in December 1932 (thus giving a greater weight to
preferred shares if they carried a higher par value).
III.B. Deﬁnition of Connected Firms
We identify businessmen and ﬁrms as connected to the
NSDAP if they meet either of two criteria. First, if business lead-
ers or ﬁrms contributed ﬁnancially to the party or to Hitler or
G¨ oring, they qualify as connected.14 Second, certain businessmen
provided political support for the Nazis at crucial moments, serv-
ing on (or helping to ﬁnance) various groups that advised the
12. If we have a price both for one day before and for one day after, the
subsequent price takes precedence.
13. The Handbuch came out in several volumes on a rolling basis throughout
the year. In a few cases we also consulted other business reference volumes such
as Salings.
14. We deliberately exclude contributions to Georg Strasser and his group of
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party or Hitler on economic policy. We also count the latter as con-
nected. Appendix I lists all relevant individuals and ﬁrms, along
with notes on the main scholarly sources for each.15 Most of these
connections are not controversial. Because some have been dis-
puted, we explain our choices in detail. We also perform a number
of sensitivity tests later to show that our key ﬁndings are robust
to changes in the deﬁnition of what it takes to be connected.
The ﬁrst group includes early contributors such as Thyssen
and Kirdorf. Their support—ﬁnancial and other—is not dis-
puted.16 It also includes the ﬁnanciers and industrialists who
participated in a meeting on February 20, 1933, at G¨ oring’s resi-
dence in Berlin. After giving a speech attacking Communism and
declaring private enterprise to be incompatible with democracy,
Hitler left the conclave. G¨ oring laid out plans for winning the
upcoming national elections, observing that “the sacriﬁces asked
for...would be so much easier for industry to bear if it realized
that the election of March 5th will surely be the last one for the
next 10 years, probably even for the next 100 years.” Schacht then
presided over the establishment of a campaign fund totaling three
million Reichsmarks for the electoral campaign.17
In the second group are businessmen whose ties to the party
also pre-dated Feb. 20. It includes the signatories of a famous
petition to President Hindenburg, urging him to appoint Hitler
as Chancellor. The signatories were providing political support
to the Nazis at a critical juncture because the party’s vote had
just declined.18 They qualify as connected according to our second
criterion.19
We also include the members of the Keppler Kreis and the
Arbeitsstelle Schacht in this group. The former was organized by
Wilhelm Keppler, a former chemical company executive, with the
15. Available on the QJE Web site.
16. Turner (1985) raised questions about the importance and representative-
ness of connected business leaders. Only the ﬁrst of these issues is relevant for
this paper.
17. NMT 6 (1952). See the discussion and references in Appendix I for Febru-
ary 20.
18. See the discussion in Turner (1985) and Stegmann (1973, 1977). Again,
we use only the undisputed signatories.
19. The February 20 meeting occurred after Hitler had become Chancellor.
It might be argued that its participants primarily represented ﬁrms and were
less likely to forge individual ties that would carry over to other enterprises with
which they were also afﬁliated. To test this, we estimated both “wide” and “nar-
row” models of the meeting, with the narrower one including only ﬁrms in which
participants served as Chair or Deputy Chair of the Aufsichtsrat or the Vorstand.
As discussed below, our results were the same.110 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
explicit aim of creating stronger links between big business and
the National Socialist Party and of inﬂuencing the latter’s eco-
nomic policies. The Arbeitsstelle Schacht was organized by the
formerReichsbank President,HjalmarSchacht. Thebusinessmen
who ﬁnanced Schacht’s circle included some of the biggest names
in German business, including Albert V¨ ogler of Vereinigte Stahl,
KruppvonBohlen,FritzSpringorum,EmilGeorgvonStauss(who
ﬁrst introduced Schacht to G¨ oring), Rosterg of Winterhall, and
Kurt von Schr¨ oder.20 Because Turner raised questions about some
of these ﬁgures, we again test the sensitivity of our results to al-
ternative deﬁnitions.21
Traditional accounts of big business involvement with the
Nazi party have focused on the relationship between managers
(Vorstand) and party ﬁgures.22 We pursue a more comprehensive
approach. The power of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)i n
the organization of German industry is difﬁcult to exaggerate. It
appoints and ﬁres executives, acting on behalf of the shareholder
assembly (Passow 1906). Part of its remit is to check on the ﬁnan-
cial reporting of joint stock companies and to consult with man-
agers before major decisions. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon boards,
executives are ordinarily not members of the supervisory board.
Far from being an ineffectual rubber-stamping institution, super-
visory boards offered central positions of power, and many of the
leading businessmen in Germany did (and still do) accept multiple
appointments. Universal banks exerted their inﬂuence habitually
through seats on the board—Gerschenkron called the supervisory
board in Germany the “most powerful organ ...w ith incorporate
organizations.”23
We trace positions on supervisory boards and executive posi-
tions of all the individuals connected to the Nazis. In combination,
these individuals deﬁne a group of Nazi “original supporters” with
credible ties to the new leadership.24 To do so, we checked each
20. Cf. Turner (1985) and Stegmann (1973, 1977).
21. Because of Henry Turner’s objections, we have excluded Paul Reusch and
Krupp from our calculations, though both their ﬁrms made substantial contribu-
tions to the Feb. 20 fund. In the same spirit, we also exclude Paul Silverberg. For
Reusch, see Langer (2003). On Silverberg, compare Turner (1985) with Mommsen
(2004) or Neebe (1981).
22. Turner (1985).
23. Gerschenkron (1962). The banks’ power is examined more closely by
Fohlin (1999).
24. Newspaper coverage of some of these individuals was extensive; such
acts as the attempt to recruit signatures on the petition to Hindenburg certainly
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name against the 1932 edition of the Handbuch der deutschen
Aktiengesellschaften. This digest gives information on members
and their functions (chair, vice-chair, or ordinary member of the
board). Since preliminary statistical tests indicated that no spe-
cial signiﬁcance attached to chairs or vice chairs, we count all of
them as of equal importance.
Our deﬁnition of Jewish-owned ﬁrms follows Mosse’s (1987)
as closely as possible. We attempt to identify “enterprises usu-
ally founded by men of Jewish extraction, with Jews prominent
in management and substantially represented on the board.”25
Because Mosse focuses on large enterprises, we cross-checked the
ﬁrms in our sample against Kaznelson’s (1962) work from the pe-
riod.26 As a further safeguard against limited coverage of small
ﬁrms, we supplement our data with information from a 1927 se-
ries of articles in the Jewish periodical Der Morgen.27
In total, we have 115 connected ﬁrms (with 119 securities)
in our sample, using our baseline deﬁnition of afﬁliations. Not
all of these have recorded share prices and/or market capital-
izations (we have market capitalizations for 81 of them). They
differ from unconnected ﬁrms in a number of important ways.
First, they were markedly larger—their average market capital-
ization of 42 million RM was ﬁve times higher than that of un-
connected ﬁrms. This appears to be in line with contemporary
comments emphasizing that large businesses had a greater inter-
est in inﬂuencing politics, perhaps because of potential free-riding
incentives for smaller ﬁrms. Weighted by market capitalization,
more than half of the ﬁrms listed on the Berlin stock market had
Nazi-connected members. This factor alone suggests that connec-
tions between the party and big business were closer than some of
the recent literature has accepted. In terms of dividend yield, the
25. Mosse(1987,p.271).“Jewish-owned”isourtermfortheﬁrstinhisfourfold
classiﬁcation of ﬁrms that in effect deﬁnes a spectrum, with the last being ﬁrms in
which Jews were altogether absent. Its use screens out ﬁrms in which, for example,
some Jewish bankers sat on a board. Other deﬁnitions are possible. Some Nazis
saw Jews almost everywhere, and G¨ oring famously declared that he decided who
was Jewish (Petropoulos 2006). But it is clear that in 1933 German Jews and
non-Jews recognized some companies as historically Jewish.
26. Its publication was interrupted by the Nazi takeover and thus only ap-
peared years later. Mosse’s lists and tables do not consistently distinguish ﬁrms
within his categories; we accordingly check our assignments against our other ref-
erences such as Kaznelson. Works by Genschel (1966), Barkai (1989), and Toury
(1984), as well as recent studies of “Aryanization” after 1933, concentrate on ﬁrms
that are not in our sample.
27. See Buer (1927); Landsberg (1927a, 1927b); and Priester (1927). In all
cases, we checked the 1932 Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften for sub-
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two groups are relatively similar—connected ﬁrms paid a slightly
higher rate of 3.4%, compared to 2.9% for unconnected ﬁrms.
In both groups, a large number of ﬁrms were not making any
payments to shareholders during the Great Depression. Prior to
Hitler’s rise to power, both groups showed almost identical log re-
turns, driven by a cyclical recovery—a rise by 0.12 during the two-
month period from November 1932 to January 1933 for connected
ﬁrms, and 0.10 for unconnected ones. During the two months af-
ter January 1933, however, the connected ﬁrms show markedly
higher returns—a difference of 0.07 in mean returns. The next
main section explores the extent to which we can document a
systematic relationship between above-average stock returns and
afﬁliation with the Nazi party. Before we can turn to the results,
we have to consider what investors could have known about con-
nections between the NSDAP and business leaders in 1933.
III.C. Publicly Available Information on Connections
Investors are unlikely to have had complete information on
the growing links between German companies and the NSDAP.
Butenoughnewswasleakingouttomakemanyoftheconnections
apparent to contemporaries. Even foreign correspondents noticed.
Schacht’s new allegiance was proﬁled in Time Magazine,w h i c h
opened a story on Germany’s political situation on December 5,
1932, observing “The famed ‘Iron Man’ of German ﬁnance, blunt
Dr. Hjalmar Schacht...came out for the ﬁrst time last week in
support of Adolf Hitler. By this abrupt move Dr. Schacht brought
a sizeable section of Berlin ﬁnance into the Biggest Business
phalanx lined up behind Handsome Adolf by Steel Tycoon Fritz
Thyssen.”28 Such a public change in political position would be
watched closely by stock market investors. Indeed, Time’s earlier
coverage of negotiations in late November highlighted the stock
market’s reaction:29
At Herr Thyssen’s...residence Leader Hitler and Oberst G¨ oring ate din-
ner after their ﬂights to Berlin.. ..Germans soon noticed the surprising fact
that several news organs of Biggest Business, such as Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung and Rheinisch-Westfalische, had abruptly switched from hostility to
support of Adolf Hitler. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung urged President
von Hindenburg “in the interest of that tranquility required for business re-
vival” to overcome his “strong personal dislike” of Fascist Hitler and appoint
him German Chancellor! .. .For the ﬁrst time in his blatant, meteoric career
28. “Only One Man ... ,” Time Magazine, December 5, 1932.
29. “Hitler Gets Warm,” Time Magazine, November 28, 1932.POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 113
Adolf Hitler was “getting warm.” Stocks on the Berlin exchange, which eased
when the von Papen Cabinet resigned, ﬁrmed again and began to rise.
As the Time reporter recognized, newspapers were often closely
linked with individual business groups. From their editorials, the
orientation of big business could be inferred. Nor was this all. Or-
ganizers of the Hindenburg Petition tried to be discreet, but the
nature of their enterprise meant that word leaked out. In Ham-
burg, for example, Keppler Kreis members systematically can-
vased the old Hanseatic town’s business community in search of
supporters. Executives associated with the town’s major shipping
ﬁrms rebuffed them, along with others, so that the effort could not
have stayed under wraps.30
Similarly, in early January, former Chancellor von Papen met
with Adolf Hitler in Cologne. The meeting was meant to be kept
secret. It was held at the home of a prominent banker, Kurt von
Schr¨ oder. We count him as connected because of his involvement
with the Keppler Kreis and his role in organizing the Hinden-
burg Petition.31 As the participants emerged, a press reporter
was waiting outside. The news of the meeting caused a sensa-
tion. Not surprisingly, the left-wing press concluded at once that
Hitler was the “agent of big business” who had been caught “in ﬂa-
grante.”32 Bycontrast,center-rightpapersliketheBerlinT¨ agliche
Rundschau focused on speciﬁc connections: “The organizer of the
discussion between Hitler–Papen is the Rhenish-Westfalen indus-
try group and the Stahlverein” (Petzold 1995). Three days later,
von Papen (who was to become Vice-Chancellor on January 30)
met with a group of inﬂuential Ruhr businessmen. A reporter
f o raD¨ usseldorf paper saw Hoesch’s Fritz Springorum meet von
Papen and reported that the group had conferred at the home
of Vereinigte Stahl’s Albert V¨ ogeler; the report was picked up by
other papers.33 Although many details remained murky, growing
contacts between the NSDAP and leading business ﬁgures were
thereformanytosee.Stockmarketinvestorsmaynothaveknown
30. See the correspondence in the folders for Emil Helfferich (C7/1) and
Wilhelm Keppler (C7/2) along with the material in C8, in the Krogmann Papers
(622-1), now in the Staatsarchiv of the City of Hamburg. We also consulted related
materials in the Institut der Zeitgeschichte of the University of Hamburg; see
especially 11 K13.
31. Turner (1970); Petzold (1995).
32. The SPD’s Vorw¨ arts, quoted in Turner (1985, p. 317).
33. Compare the accounts in Petzold (1995) and Turner (1985). Petzold notes
that V¨ ogler was present at the meeting, but that it was not actually held at his
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every detail. They may also have misinterpreted some aspects of
connections.34 Nonetheless, it is clear that many of them could
have known enough to bid up the prices of connected ﬁrms.
IV. STOCK RETURNS AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST AFFILIATION
In this section, we estimate the value of Nazi afﬁliations. We
evaluate the effect on the cross-section of returns for listed ﬁrms
between January and March 1933, compare it to returns in 1932,
and experiment with additional controls.
IV.A. Main Findings
To pin down the beneﬁts of having Nazi afﬁliations, we use a
starting date before the NSDAP’s entry into government was pub-
licknowledgeorhighlylikely.AsTurner(1996)emphasized,many
editorialwriterslookingbackattheendof1932concludedthatthe
Nazi menace was receding—the republic had survived. A month
later, the leader of the NSDAP had become Chancellor. Accounts
of the negotiations emphasize that the outcome was in doubt lit-
erally to the last hours before Hitler and the other members of
the new government presented themselves to Hindenburg on the
morning of the thirtieth of January (Turner 1996; Schwerin von
Krosigk 1974, 1977). It is also commonly agreed that the results
of the election in Lippe-Detmold on January 15, 1933, affected the
bargaining. We thus use January 10 as a safe last date when stock
prices were undisturbed.35
After the summer of 1932, the rising tide of Germany’s recov-
ering economy lifted all boats. Following the “seizure of power,” in-
vestors may have cheered the appearance of a more broadly based
government (Figure I). In addition, those ﬁrms that supported the
Nazis ﬁnancially or had business leaders with strong links to the
NSDAP on their boards experienced share-price increases many
times larger than thegeneral rise inthe market.36 Figure IIshows
the distributions. The modal return on Nazi-afﬁliated ﬁrms was
about 8 log points higher than for unconnected ﬁrms.
34. Turner (1985, 1996) argued that business leaders played essentially no
role in the ﬁnal rise of Hitler; but see also the discussion in Petzold (1995), which
draws on a wealth of archival material.
35. We also checked the results if we substitute mid-December as a starting
date; they are unchanged. Pushing back the date, in general, makes rises associ-
ated with NSDAP connections larger.
36. Connected ﬁrms saw their share prices rise 30 times faster than uncon-
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FIGURE II
Distribution of Log Returns, January–March 1933, Connected and Unconnected
Firms
Interestingly, connected ﬁrms did not do better before the
Machtergreifung. Nor were excess returns simply the result of
other observable characteristics, such as market capitalization.
Table III shows the impact of being afﬁliated with the NSDAP for
two two-month periods, November 32 to January 33, and January
33 to March 33, controlling for other characteristics. For the pe-
riod prior to Hitler’s accession to power, the na¨ ıve regression of re-
turns on our Nazi dummy does not suggest signiﬁcant beneﬁts for
connected ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is robust to including the dividend
yield and the log of market capitalization as control variables. The
November elections had gone badly for the Nazi party and caused
aninternalcrisis.Also,theappointmentofGeneralvonSchleicher
seemed to rule out any entry into government in the near future.
There is also no signiﬁcant effect from being Jewish-owned.
The lower panel of Table III documents signiﬁcant outper-
formance over the period from mid-January to mid-March. Nazi-
afﬁliated ﬁrms saw their prices increase by almost 7% more than
therest. Controlling for additional characteristics strengthens the
result. Firms with large market capitalizations were more likely
to be Nazi-afﬁliated, but size alone did not aid in the recovery of
stock prices. Regression (6) shows that ﬁrms with higher market116 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE III
OLS REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE:L OG RETURNS
NOVEMBER 1932–JANUARY 1933; JANUARY 1933–MARCH 1933)
Regression
1234 5
Nazi 0.0175 −0.002 0.012 0.012 0.021
(0.79) (0.08) (0.48) (0.047) (0.95)
Market cap −1.8e − 11 1.3e − 12 6.7e − 12 5e−11
(0.3) (0.02) (0.09) (0.9)




Constant 0.104∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(9.63) (10.2) (7.0) (7.0) (6.7)
β 0.002
(0.9)
Adj. R2 0.001 0.006 0.01 0.007 0.004
N 436 352 299 299 277
Regression
6789 1 0
Nazi 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(4.6) (4.5) (4.3) (4.3) (2.7)
Market cap 9e−11∗ 3.5e − 11 3.9e − 11 5e−12
(1.7) (0.7) (0.8)




Constant 0.0024 −0.003 −0.013 −0.01 0.13∗
(0.3) (0.3) (1.3) (1.1) (7.7)
β 0.002
(1.5)
Adj. R2 0.038 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.05
N 448 374 317 317 265
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are based on Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent esti-
mates and clustered on the level of the ﬁrm.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels of conﬁdence.
capitalizations did somewhat better than the rest of the market.
High dividend yields were rewarded during the period. Our esti-
mate of the value of NSDAP afﬁliation rises to 8.4% when con-
trolling for these factors. Overall, while 68% of afﬁliated ﬁrms
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of unconnected ﬁrms did.37 We also examined if the outperfor-
mance of Nazi-afﬁliated ﬁrms could be a result of greater risk-
iness. Connected ﬁrms had a higher average beta.38 However,
adding the betas to the basic regression setup as an additional
explanatory variable does not change our main result.
As Gelman and Stern (2006) argue, the difference between
signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant results may itself be insigniﬁcant.
We pooled returns for two periods, Nov. 32 to Jan. 33, and Jan.
33 to March 33 and ran the return against our measure of NS
afﬁliation, an NS power dummy, and an interaction effect. We
ﬁnd that NS afﬁliation on its own is not associated with higher
returns (coefﬁcient 0.018, t-statistic 0.8) and that the Nazi seizure
of power on its own did not boost stock market values (coefﬁcient
−0.10, t-statistic 7.6). The interaction dummy has a coefﬁcient
of 0.054, t-statistic 1.99, which suggests signiﬁcance at the 95%
level (N = 867). Thus, being associated with the Nazi party only
boosted stock prices after the party came into ofﬁce.
Connections with the Nazi party could be established in a
variety of ways. Were they all equally useful? As Table A2 in
Appendix II (available on QJE Web site) shows, all types of afﬁlia-
tion generated a signiﬁcant excess return for the period January–
March 1933. As one would expect as a result of smaller sample
size,thesigniﬁcancelevelsaresometimeslower,butnoneisstatis-
tically different from the baseline results. The estimates in Table
A2 also conﬁrm that one potentially contentious decision is not
decisive—we counted ﬁrms contributing on February 20 as con-
nected. This could be seen as inappropriate because stock returns
from January 10 to February 10 are counted as if these ﬁrms had
already established a close link. Overall, their stock market re-
turns look remarkably similar to those of other ﬁrms that had
established connections previously.39
Jewish-owned ﬁrms as a whole underperformed the market.
However, the result falls short of statistical signiﬁcance. This may
37. Our ﬁndings are not driven by outliers. We estimate median regressions
and obtain a signiﬁcant outperformance of 6.96%. Nor is our main ﬁnding sensitive
to alternative event windows. Using a ﬁve-month window (January–May 1933),
we ﬁnd a coefﬁcient on the Nazi dummy of 0.069 (Appendix II, Table A1).
38. We calculated betas for the period April 1932–December 1932. Although
the short period is not ideal, the risk of structural breaks is considerable if we
include the period before September 1931, before the stock exchange closure.
39. This is partly because, of the 55 ﬁrms we count as connected under the
wider deﬁnition, 32 have connections in addition to participating on February 20.
If, to err on the side of caution, we exclude ﬁrms whose only connection with the
NSDAP stems from that meeting and reestimate the full speciﬁcation (8) from
Table III, we obtain a coefﬁcient of 0.065 (t-statistic 2.75).118 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE IV
COEFFICIENTS ON NAZI DUMMY,M ONTH BY MONTH
1932 NS-afﬁliated 1933 NS-afﬁliated
May–June 0.018 Nov–Dec 0.015
(1.1) (1.3)
June–July 0.008 Dec–Jan 0.004
(0.5) (0.23)
July–Aug 0.049∗ Jan–Feb 0.019∗
(1.7) (1.7)
Aug–Sept −0.005 Feb–Mar 0.045∗∗∗
(0.21) (4.3)
Sept–Oct −0.026∗ Mar–Apr −0.012
(1.7) (0.67)
Oct–Nov −0.004 Apr–May −0.0001
(0.4) (0.01)
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are based on Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent esti-
mates. Estimation based on regression (9) in Table III, including a full set of controls.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
simply reﬂect measurement error. Although we made strenuous
efforts to pin down ownership, it is likely that some errors remain.
In addition, other factors may be at work. Some analysts have
suggested that in 1933, Nazi agitation focused primarily on re-
tail stores and related consumer goods sectors.40 The market may
also have reﬂected expectations of a relatively smooth transfer of
ownership from Jewish to Aryan investors or managers. Although
some short-term upheaval may be associated with wresting con-
trolfromexistingowners,investorsmaynothaveexpectedamajor
impact on proﬁtability. From the simple OLS results, we conclude
that having a board member who supported the Nazis or signed
petitions for Hitler apparently produced substantial payoffs on
the stock market.
IV.B. Results over Time
As a next step, we estimate the returns to being Nazi-
afﬁliated for each month. Table IV shows that the extent of out-
performance by connected ﬁrms varied over time. For the period
before January 1933, there is some evidence that political events
mattered for the cross section of stock returns. As the Br¨ uning
Cabinet fell at the end of May, positive returns began to accumu-
late for the Nazi-connected ﬁrms. The only period with signiﬁcant
40. For evidence that attacks were concentrated on retail and consumer goods
sectors, see, for example, Comite des delegations juives (1934) and Tooze (2006).POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 119
positive returns is from mid-July to mid-August 1932, showing a
plus of 4.9%. This is the time when the NSDAP scored its biggest
electoral success up to that date. Immediately following the elec-
tions, Hitler entered into negotiations with Chancellor von Papen
and the President, who was responsible for appointing the cabi-
net (Bracher 1984). The Chancellor in particular explored various
schemes to integrate Hitler and the Nazi movement into the gov-
ernment (Petzold 1995). For the period from June 10 to August
10, we ﬁnd a rise in the value of NS-connected ﬁrms by 6.5%.41
In the fall of 1932, Hitler’s hopes for ofﬁce were quickly
dashed.InsistingontheChancellorship,hefoundhimselfspurned
by the President. Negotiations collapsed on August 13 (Bracher
1984). It became apparent that another minority cabinet would
come to ofﬁce, probably for only a few months. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant
underperformance for the period August 10 to September 10, by
2.6%—eroding about half of the previous gains. The Reichstag
elections in November produced a serious setback for the Nazi
movement, which lost 2 million votes compared to the high point
in July. This had no signiﬁcant effect on share prices, probably
because the stock market had already discounted hopes of entry
into government after the failed negotiations in August.
The results by month also suggest that outperformance of
connected ﬁrms between January and May 1933 was not contin-
uous but mainly occurred over two months—from mid-January
to mid-March. Immediately after Hitler’s accession to power, the
stock market rewarded connected ﬁrms. Their prices jumped by
close to 2%, but the move was smaller than in the summer of 1932.
Given the instability of Weimar cabinets and the seemingly weak
position of the Nazi Party in the new government (only Hitler and
two other party members held ofﬁce), the stock market seems to
have been skeptical about the long-term value of connections.
Few observers could have had such doubts by mid-March,
after a round of fresh elections. As Robert Crozier Long, the
New York Times’s Berlin correspondent observed,42 “The German
business community received the news of Hitler’s electoral victory
41. Signiﬁcant at the 5% level of conﬁdence. The “connection” variable is
designed with the period after January 1933 in mind; some of the connections that
we track—such as those arising from the Hindenburg Petition—had not yet been
established. This will add to the noise in our explanatory variable.
42. New York Times, March 13, p. 24. Another article from the same day
reports on “Week’s Violent Rise in Stocks at Berlin” and emphasizes the high
trading volume (p. 24). By March 27, the New York Times reported that the three-
week-long stock market boom was coming to an end due to proﬁt-taking. New York
Times, March 27, 1933, p. 23.120 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
calmly. Some business men even expressed enthusiasm, and a
rather wild advance occurred on the Berlin Boerse, in which
leading stocks gained 15 to 25 points within three days.” In
the Reichstag elections on March 5, the NSDAP and the na-
tionalistKampffront Schwarz-Weiß-Rot obtainedaparliamentary
majority. Perhaps more importantly, the massive crackdown on
the Communists after the Reichstag ﬁre in February and the in-
timidation in the run-up to the election made it clear that a new
authoritarian and more durable regime was taking hold. Also, in
the meeting on February 20, Hitler and his associates had tried to
reassure business leaders, distancing themselves from the social
revolutionaries in the party. For the period from February 10 to
March 10, 1933, our data show that connected ﬁrms outperformed
by 4.5%. Between mid-March and mid-April, little additional in-
formation seems to have arrived that would have caused more
excitement among stock market investors about Nazi-connected
ﬁrms. According to our estimates, the stock market rewarded con-
nected ﬁrms overall with a return of approximately 11%–12% for
the period from April 1932 to May 1933 (depending on the controls
used).
We also estimated returns for Jewish ﬁrms over time.43
They underperform in every sample month after Hitler’s rise to
power, but the coefﬁcient is not tightly estimated. For the period
January–March, we ﬁnd underperformance by 2.4%, which is not
signiﬁcant. It is only when we include the returns for April and
May that the overall effect becomes large and signiﬁcant (−6.8%,
signiﬁcant at the 10% level). It appears that the stock market
took the threat to Jewish ﬁrms seriously only after the start of
the nationwide boycott of Jewish stores in April, when other anti-
Jewish measures were also enacted. Observers noted that Jewish
department stores were particularly hard-hit.44
V. ROBUSTNESS
V.A. The Effect of Size
Numerous large ﬁrms were connected with the Nazi party.
Smaller ones formed markedly fewer associations. If there are
nonlinearities in the way in which size inﬂuenced the chances
43. Results available from the authors upon request.
44. New York Times, April 3, 1933, p. 23.POLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 121
TABLE V
RESULTS BY QUINTILE/SIZE
Size indicator Unconnected Connected Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Top quintile?
Yes 42 38 0.066∗∗∗ 3.3
No 277 43 0.0846∗∗∗ 2.6
By quintile
Smallest quintile (Q1) 67 13 −0.017 0.24
Q2 77 3 0.27∗∗ 2.25
Q3 69 11 0.13∗∗∗ 2.89
Q4 64 16 0.089∗∗ 2.1
Biggest (Q5) 42 38 0.066∗∗∗ 3.25
Firms in top 200?
Yes 51 24 0.123∗∗∗ 3.5
No 243 56 0.067∗∗∗ 2.7
Coefﬁcients from full regression speciﬁcation including dividend yield, market capitalization, and Jewish
ownership.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
of afﬁliating with the Nazi party, controlling for market capital-
ization will not be sufﬁcient. Therefore we investigate whether
the beneﬁts from association depended on the size of the
ﬁrm.
Table V gives the results. We examine whether ﬁrms outside
the highest quintile by market capitalization show different re-
turns, by estimating for each quintile separately, and test whether
being in the top 200 largest industrial concerns (ranked by 1929
assets) inﬂuenced returns (Chandler 1990, Appendix C2).
There are 38 connected ﬁrms in the top quintile by market
capitalization.Theyoutperformthe42unconnectedﬁrmsby6.6%.
Outside the highest quintile, the returns from afﬁliating with the
Nazi party were actually somewhat higher (8.5%). Outside the
largest quintile, sample sizes are smaller. We ﬁnd consistently
signiﬁcant and large excess returns in quintiles 2 through 5, vary-
ing from 6.6% to 27%. For the smallest ﬁrms, there appears to be
no effect. Because there are only 13 connected ﬁrms, this may
simply reﬂect a lack of identifying variation. We also compare
the effect of NS connections within and outside of the list of the
largest 200 ﬁrms. The ranking is different because we use assets,
not market capitalization. Here, the results for large ﬁrms are
bigger than those for the rest—they appear about twice as big.122 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Afﬁliated ﬁrms outside the Top 200 nonetheless record signiﬁcant
outperformance.45
V.B. Rearmament
If the NSDAP stood for a policy, it was to free Germany from
the shackles of the Versailles Treaty. This limited army size to
100,000 and placed major constraints on the types of weapons
Germany could manufacture. Military aircraft, for example, were
banned. Could our main results be driven by expectations of an
increase in armament production? As we will show below, ﬁrms
with relevant skills for rearmament were more likely to form af-
ﬁliations with the NSDAP. Here, we show that possible arms sup-
pliers showed excess returns after January 1933. Nevertheless,
the value of NS connections is not affected by controlling for the
armament effect.46
We investigate the effect of being a potential weapons sup-
plier in case of future rearmament. To this end, we use a list com-
piled by the Reichswehr in 1927–28, tabulating ﬁrms that were
important for general armament production (Hansen 1978, App.
6, 10). As Eq. (1), Table VI, shows, being on the Reichswehr list
produced a positive return of 6.5% percent after January 30, but
the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant. It also does not change the size or
signiﬁcance of the Nazi dummy. This conclusion is robust to a wide
range of alternative speciﬁcations and deﬁnitions.47 We conclude
that the Nazi dummy does not simply capture the expected ben-
eﬁts of rearmament, but that some of the excess returns earned
by ﬁrms on the Berlin stock exchange after January 30, 1933,
reﬂected an expectation of future rearmament.
45. When we interact the NS dummy variable with the Top 200 variable,
we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effect above and beyond what the NS dummy
predicts.
46. Recent scholarship on the NSDAP has stressed their commitment to rear-
mament at an early stage (Epkenhans 2003; Tooze 2006), whereas earlier scholars
gave less emphasis to the issue (Turner 1985). For further evidence, cf. the ex-
cerpts from the Denkschrift des Reichverbandes der deutschen Eisenindustrie f¨ ur
Generalleutnant Alfred von Vollar-Bockelberg, Chef des Heereswaffenamtes, Jan.
16, 1933 in K¨ uhnl (1975), along with the detailed analysis in Hansen (1978).
47. We experimented with alternative deﬁnitions of armament producers. Re-
sultsarereportedinTableA3,AppendixII.Reichswehr2isbasedonalistcompiled
in 1931. Reichswehr 3 adds other ﬁrms mentioned in Hansen’s text as working
in armaments. We also deﬁned four broad arms-related sectors: chemicals, trans-
portation, steel, and coal. These sectors jointly show signiﬁcant outperformance.
Part of this effect is due to the NS-afﬁliated ﬁrms. As equation (6), Table A6,
Appendix II shows, armaments sectors outperformed by 6.9%. The Nazi dummy









Dividend yield 0.485∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.47∗
(2.60) [2.5] (1.7)
Market capitalization 4.42e − 11 −4.7e − 12 1.7e − 11
(0.89) [0.04] (0.2)
Jewish-owned −0.0212 −0.01 −0.01
(−0.84) (0.5) (0.2)
Constant −0.0136 −0.02 −0.016
(−1.21) (1.4) (1.1)
N 317 317 312






If the prospect of rearmament paid rewards in the early
months of Hitler’s regime, was sectoral composition more gen-
erally behind some of the striking differences in returns? Could
the large price jumps of afﬁliated ﬁrms simply reﬂect overrepre-
sentation of certain sectors, which could expect to beneﬁt from a
change in policy under Chancellor Hitler? Or did afﬁliations with
the Nazi party produce higher than average returns in all sectors?
Table VII shows the number of afﬁliated and unafﬁliated
ﬁrms, by sector. It also gives the log returns for the period from
January to March 1933. With the exception of two sectors (con-
struction and insurance), afﬁliated ﬁrms consistently show higher
returns than unafﬁliated ones. The return difference varies from
−0.128 to 0.155. Results for three industries are statistically
signiﬁcant—chemicals, steel, and machinery. When we estimate
with a full set of controls (ﬁnal column), we obtain similar signs,
but size and signiﬁcance levels change.
Sample sizes are small for many sectors. Nonetheless, differ-
ences are positive in nine of eleven sectors. This suggests that
outperformance was not concentrated in a handful of them, even124 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE VII
AFFILIATION AND RETURNS BY SECTOR
Coefﬁcient
Number of Log return Difference from model
observations Jan–March (t-statistic) with controlsa
Afﬁliated? No Yes No Yes
Electric industry 6 7 −0.044 0.054 0.098 −0.077
(1.34) (1.0)
Utilities 19 6 0.029 0.044 0.015 0.007
(0.3) (0.2)
Construction 35 3 0.016 −0.011 −0.014 −0.046
(0.3) (0.5)
Coal 10 8 0.022 0.096 0.073 0.078
(1.64) (1.1)
Transportation 13 12 0.022 0.07 0.0477 0.28∗∗∗
(0.9) (2.9)
Insurance 16 2 0.11 −0.017 −0.128 −0.017
(1.57) (0.4)
Steel 14 20 −0.032 0.108 0.14∗∗ 0.134
(3.1) (1.4)
Chemicals 29 8 0.022 0.11 0.088∗ 0.07
(1.74) (1.62)
Banks 28 8 0.0002 0.0477 0.048 0.068
(1.57) (1.5)
Food 50 3 0.032 0.072 0.04 0.18∗∗
(0.58) (2.2)
Machinery 60 6 −0.04 0.115 0.155∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(2.2) (2.5)





aDividend yield, market capitalization, Jewish ownership.
if ﬁnding statistically signiﬁcant results is easier in those with
larger sample sizes. To assess whether random variability and
small sample size could be responsible for the differences in coef-
ﬁcients, we perform meta-analysis on our results. From the ﬁxed
effects speciﬁcation, we obtain an effect of 0.061, signiﬁcant at the
99.9% level.48 Overall, these results suggest that connected ﬁrms
48. Random effects estimation yields virtually identical results. There is also
no evidence that the difference between the two groups differed systematically
in our subsamples—the Q-statistic of 12.5 cannot reject the null of no systematic
heterogeneity (p = .251). We also examined whether the signiﬁcant effect overallPOLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 125
saw gains in their stock prices across most sectors, even if the ef-
fect is not always tightly estimated. Also, adding sectoral controls
does not undermine the size and signiﬁcance of the Nazi dummy
variable.49
V.D. Extreme Bounds Analysis
In all previous tables, we provided stepwise variations of
the basic regression setup. If researchers only report combina-
tion of variables that produce signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, inference
will be invalid. We use a form of Leamer-style extreme bounds
analysis to safeguard against this potential problem (Levine and
Renelt 1992). Using 73,815 possible combinations of regressors—
including all sector dummies, market capitalization, the dividend
yield, the Jewish dummy, size quintiles, Reichswehr association,
beta, and twenty dummies of regional origin—the smallest coefﬁ-
cient we obtain for the Nazi variable is 0.059 (t-statistic 3.1) and
the biggest is 0.11 (t-statistic 5.8).50 Despite using a large num-
ber of possible combinations of regressors, we consistently ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful coefﬁcient.
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) make the valid point that the entire
distribution of coefﬁcients, and not just the extreme bounds, mat-
ters. Because the stringent Levine-Renelt method raises the bar
relative to the Sala-i-Martin approach, our results are a lower
bound on the true stability of the effect of party afﬁliation.
V.E. Alternative Deﬁnitions of Afﬁliation
What constitutes afﬁliation with the Nazi party is crucial for
the analysis presented in this paper. There is a large historical
literature on the topic discussing which businessman maintained
what kind of link.51 In many cases, there are questions about
the participation or the importance of individuals. In this sub-
section, we show that our results are not sensitive to alternative
deﬁnitions of connection with the Nazi party. Our baseline spec-
iﬁcation deliberately included a number of businessmen whose
depended on any one of the sectors being included, dropping each industry in turn.
The coefﬁcient on the meta analysis never falls below 0.04 and always remains
signiﬁcant at the 95% level of conﬁdence.
49. Cf. Appendix II, Table A4.
50. We use the EBA do-ﬁle for STATA, with a maximum of 4 additional re-
gressors (in addition to the Nazi dummy), as implemented by Gregorio Impavido.
51. Cf. Turner (1985); Petzold (1995).126 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
involvement with the Nazi Party has been questioned by some
scholars. Others were excluded because the weight of evidence
seems to lean against their participation. Both types of choices
are not necessarily compelling. We vary our setup step by step.
The fundraiser on February 20 is different in nature because
the NSDAP was already in power.52 Otto Wolff’s support for the
regime has been questioned by some. Similarly, Emil Georg von
Stauss’s position may have been more ambiguous, even if he ex-
tended ﬁnancial support to G¨ oring and Arbeitsstelle Schacht and
thus qualiﬁes for our baseline group.53 We also test the inclusion
of von Schr¨ oder’s senior partner, von Stein. In addition, we also
experiment with adding various individuals, such as Reusch and
Bingel, whom we excluded from our baseline. Because Turner
(1985) raised a question about which Tengelmann attended the
February 20 meeting, we also check his inclusion.
In Table A5, Appendix II, we present the results for these
alternative speciﬁcations of the connection variable. Adding two
questionable cases—Reusch and Bingel—results in a coefﬁcient
that is 0.005% lower, but not statistically different from the base-
line. If we do not count Otto Wolff as connected, the coefﬁcient on
the Nazi dummy falls minimally, and the statistical signiﬁcance
is reduced somewhat—yet it remains strong overall. Similarly, ex-
cluding the contributors on February 20 reduces signiﬁcance to a
small extent, but does not undermine our results. Neither does
von Stein’s or von Stauss’s exclusion. Even when we use a very
stringent deﬁnition, excluding all those ﬁrms whose connection
derives solely from participation in the February 20 fundraiser
or whose ties depended on von Stauss, Tengelmann, von Stein,
Springorum, V¨ ogler, or Wolff, we ﬁnd positive and highly signif-
icant (if slightly lower) returns of 5.7%. Also, we cannot reject
the null that the coefﬁcient under the most stringent deﬁnition
of party afﬁliation is identical with the baseline result. We con-
clude that our connection variable is robust to a wide range of
alternative coding choices.
Despite the care we have taken in analyzing afﬁliations, it is
possible that the key right-hand-side variable—connections with
the Nazi Party—is measured with error. Some of the ﬁrms in our
sample may have made contributions that left no trace in the
52. In this case, we move 23 ﬁrms from the afﬁliated to the unafﬁliated cate-
gory.
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surviving records. Our set of connected companies may only be
a subset of those that lent support to the NSDAP. If the group
of ﬁrms we classify as “nonafﬁliated” contains some ﬁrms that
did contribute (and were seen to have done so by investors), we
probably understate the true impact on stock prices. To examine
how this possibility might affect our results, we employ errors-in-
variable estimation.54 As column (2) in Table VI shows, the size
and signiﬁcance of the Nazi-afﬁliation dummy increases, suggest-
ing a true outperformance of 11% if the noise ratio is 0.25.55
VI. SELECTION AND ENDOGENEITY
VI.A. Determinants of Association
There are good reasons to think that some ﬁrms sought prox-
imity to the NSDAP more vigorously than others. One of the rea-
sons may have been that they expected a greater payback. This
could undermine the validity of our earlier analysis—either be-
cause unobserved variables are responsible for the results, or be-
cause of endogeneity issues.
A simple probit regression (Table VIII) of afﬁliation on ob-
servable ﬁrm characteristics yields some striking results. Our
standard explanatory variables (market capitalization, dividend
yield, Jewish) only show that bigger ﬁrms were more likely to
form connections. Overall, we cannot explain more than 8% of the
variation in party connections with these variables. Proxies for
military usefulness improve results. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrms with
Reichswehr connections, and those in sectors useful to the armed
forces, were much more likely to associate with the Nazi party.
A large literature has examined the determinants of the
Nazi Party’s electoral appeal.56 Many studies found that re-
ligion was a good predictor of NSDAP election results, with
Catholic voters much more immune to the party’s appeal than
Protestants. In electoral districts with above average results for
the Nazi Party, Protestants outnumbered Catholics 4:1, whereas
they only accounted for one-third of the population in districts
with below-average results (Bracher 1984).57 Also, border regions
tended to be much more nationalistic, and hence prone to vote for
54. Hardin and Carroll (2003).
55. Table A6 in Appendix II shows the results for alternative values of the
signal-to-noise ratio.
56. Falter (1991); Falter, Linderberger, and Schumann (1986).
57. Subsequent research has emphsized these results (Falter 1991).128 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE VIII
PROBIT REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE:N AZI DUMMY)
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dividend yield 0.99 3.3∗
(0.49) (1.8)




Reichswehr 3 1.19∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗
(4.4) (4.2)
Arms sector 0.94∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(7.8) (6.1)
KP vote 0.046∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(4.4) (2.6)






Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.22
N 334 789 454 454 454 322
Regional N N Y Y Y Y
clustering
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the regional level in equations (3)–(6).
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively.
the NSDAP. Whatever the effects among voters, the same mecha-
nisms were clearly not at work among ﬁrms. As Table VIII shows,
we obtain an insigniﬁcant negative effect on the proportion of
Protestants in a region, while border regions register a positive
but insigniﬁcant effect.
We also analyze the effect of election results in the regions of
origin for our ﬁrms, using the November 6, 1932 returns (Falter,
Lindenberger, and Schumann 1986). Both the Communist and
the NS vote explain some of the pattern of association. That re-
gions with a more popular Communist party also had more NS-
afﬁliated ﬁrms is not surprising. One of the key messages sent by
the NSDAP in its dealings with business leaders was its commit-
ment to defeat Communism and protect private property. Where
local conditions suggested that this threat was grave, more exec-
utives and directors had links with the NSDAP. The opposite sign
for the NS vote may look surprising—regions where the party hadPOLITICAL CONNECTIONS IN NAZI GERMANY 129
greater electoral appeal had fewer associated ﬁrms. However, un-
til 1934, the NSDAP contained at least two different groupings—a
socialist wing that was strongly anticapitalist under the Strasser
brothers, and a more conservative wing. Some regions where the
Nazi Party polled strongly, such as Berlin, were dominated by
more left-wing elements. This may have reduced the party’s ap-
peal in the eyes of business leaders.
Overall, when combining all the signiﬁcant variables and the
standard controls, we ﬁnd that about three-quarters of the vari-
ation in associations cannot be explained. We think of this as re-




So far, we have implicitly assumed that membership in the
“connected” group was essentially random. However, there are
a number of observable characteristics that correlate with being
connected with the Nazi party. Even if they do not explain a large
share of the total variation, the Nazi dummy variable may be
partly endogenous, and inference will be invalid.
One standard way of dealing with the endogeneity problem
is to perform matching using a set of controls that inﬂuence
assignment to the “treated” or “untreated” group. In this way,
we compare the share price performance of ﬁrms with similar
observable characteristics, using n-dimensional matching.58 The
same control variables as used in Table III, plus a full set of
sector and regional dummies, are employed to calculate propen-
sity scores. Returns of the most similar ﬁrms are then compared
with each other. As Dehejia and Wahba (1999) argue, propensity-
score matching can overcome endogeneity problems by focusing
comparisons on subgroups of observations that are strictly com-
parable.Theirresultssuggestahighsuccessrateinreplicatingre-
sults from experimental studies. We use two alternative methods
for estimating differences between the matched groups—nearest
neighbor matching (with the three most similar ﬁrms being
compared) and a kernel approach using a continuous weighting
function.
For the period January–March 1933, the strongly positive
effect of Nazi afﬁliation is conﬁrmed—the matching estimator
58. Abadie et al. (2002). The propensity scores come from probit estimation.130 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE IX
MATCHING ESTIMATOR RESULTS:S TOCK RETURNS
Difference (95%
Treated Controls conﬁdence interval)
11/32–1/33
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.115 0.071 0.044 [−0.039, 0.146]
Kernel 0.128 0.104 0.024 [−0.05, 0.11]
1/33–3/33
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.078 −0.001 0.079 [0.021, 0.18]
Kernel 0.088 0.002 0.086 [0.038, 0.19]
“Treated” refers to ﬁrms predicted to be Nazi-afﬁliated; “controls” are ﬁrms with similar characteristics
based on the propensity scores derived from probit estimates, using market capitalization, dividend yield,
Jewish ownership, regional dummies, and sector dummies as explanatory variables. The 95% conﬁdence
interval, based on percentiles of the difference (in square brackets), was derived from bootstrap estimation
with 1,000 repetitions (results are bias-corrected).
results suggest outperformance of around 8%, signiﬁcant at the
95% level of conﬁdence (Table IX). The two-month period prior to
the Nazis coming to power shows some outperformance, but the
result is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Overall, the impact
of relaxing the linearity assumption is small—we broadly ﬁnd the
same results as under OLS.
Instead of matching, we can use an instrument for NS afﬁlia-
tion that is itself not connected with stock market returns. Most of
the determinants of association explored above will be correlated
with the error term. If there is one exception, it is the electoral
preferences of voters in the region of origin. There is, for example,
no obvious reason that ﬁrms located in Communist-dominated ar-
eas should have outperformed, except for the varying likelihood of
associating with the Nazi Party.59 We therefore use regional elec-
tion results to instrument for afﬁliation.60 Equation (3), Table VI
gives the result of using Communist votes as an instrument for
NS afﬁliation of ﬁrms. The coefﬁcient for the Nazi dummy is
consistently large, suggesting an excess return of ten percentage
points.61
59. Note that the correlation coefﬁcient between KP vote and the arms sector
is 0.1, and for Reichswehr 3 and KP vote −0.008. Hence, it is not the case that
Communist election results simply reﬂect the strength of sectors most likely to
associate with the NSDAP.
60. We cluster all of our results at the level of the region.
61. Table A7 in Appendix II presents the results of alternative estimation
techniques. Coefﬁcients range from 8% to 16%. Signiﬁcance inevitably declines,
and falls below the customary threshold in one speciﬁcation. Where we esti-
mate with both the NS and the Communist vote, the Hansen J-test fails to
reject the null of uncorrelated errors, suggesting that the exclusion restriction
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VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Just as in 1990s Malaysia and Indonesia, the stock market
in Nazi Germany realized the value of political connections when
it saw them. To understand the value of political connections in
Germany, we examine the directorships and management ties of
listedﬁrms.Interlockingdirectorateswerethekeytothecountry’s
industrial power structure—a phenomenon known as “Deutsch-
land AG.” We use this basic insight to track the inﬂuence of con-
tributorstotheNaziparty.Among theparty’ssupporters wecount
only those that contributed funds, or offered direct support for the
“movement,” or for appointing Hitler Chancellor. Tracing them
through the contemporary handbooks on German ﬁrms, we ex-
amine which business leaders with ties to the NSDAP served on
supervisory and management boards. Despite the restrictive def-
initions, we ﬁnd that 115 ﬁrms (with 119 listed securities) in our
sample of 751 ﬁrms were connected in one way or another. Be-
cause these ﬁrms were, on the average, larger and more highly
capitalized than unafﬁliated ﬁrms, they accounted for more than
half of the Berlin stock market’s capitalization.
Share prices in Germany may not have been rising more than
in other countries after January 30, 1933, but a very substantial
part of the increase that we observe reﬂected the value of political
connections with the new party in power—and not general im-
provements in business conditions. Firms that had “bet on Hitler”
beneﬁted substantially. They saw their stock price rise by 5% to
8% faster between January and March than comparable ﬁrms.
Most of the excess returns accumulated between January 30 and
March 10, 1933. As uncertainty about the new regime’s nature
and permanence declined between January 30 and mid-March,
the stock prices of connected ﬁrms rallied substantially. We ﬁnd
strong evidence that the stock market bid up the share prices of
connected ﬁrms beyond what can be explained by size, proﬁtabil-
ity, or sectoral origin. This result is not driven by outliers or the
sectoral composition of donor groups.
Overall, the change in stock market value as a result of polit-
ical change in Germany in early 1933 was sizable—market cap-
italization in our sample increased by 5.8%, equivalent to RM
383 mio between mid-January and mid-March 1933. Excess re-
turns earned by connected ﬁrms were responsible for 358 mio, or
93%; the remaining 25 mio came from unconnected ﬁrms. The ef-
fect is broadly comparable in magnitude to what has been found
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withtheseothercases.IntheUnitedStates,theso-called“Jeffords
effect” wiped $84 billion off share prices (when ﬁrms with Repub-
lican soft-money connections fell in price; Jayachandran [2006]).
This was equivalent to 0.7% of market capitalization and 0.8% of
GDP. The political events we track unfolded over different time
horizons. Per month, the NS seizure of power generated as much
of a discontinuity as Senator Jeffords’ change in position, and a
bigger one than in Indonesia.
When scaled by GDP, the effect in Nazi Germany is very
similar in magnitude to the Jeffords effect, but smaller than in
Malaysia. There, the political value of connections fell by $5.4
billion during the crisis, according to Johnson and Mitton (2003),
equivalent to 9% of market capitalization and 6.3% of GDP. Scaled
by market capitalization, the German case is more dramatic than
either the United States in 2001 or Malaysia in 1997–1998. In
the early days of the Hitler regime, gains of connected ﬁrms in
our sample are 5.8% of (sample) market capitalization and 0.7%
of GDP. Since we only have one (of many) exchanges in Germany
in our sample, and were unable to construct capitalization ﬁgures
for all Berlin-listed ﬁrms, this may well represent a lower bound
of the true effect. If the ﬁrms outside our sample had a similar
composition in terms of afﬁliation and showed similar responses,
the rise in share prices as a result of excess returns for connected
ﬁrms would be equivalent to 1.53% of GDP.62
With a median stock market value of 42 mio RM (as of
December 1932) of connected ﬁrms, the 7%–8% outperformance
translated into gains of approximately 3 mio RM. Known contri-
butions to the party were, by comparison, small. At the famous
February 20, 1933, meeting to raise campaign funds, for example,
IG Farben appears to have made the largest single contribution—
400,000 RM. Subsequently, the ﬁrm’s stock market capitalization
increased by 12% to 1,190 mio in March. Of this gain, the baseline
coefﬁcient in Table III (equation (4)) attributes 86 mio to NS con-
nection.63 Most ﬁrms provided only a fraction of what IG Farben
62. We use Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) ﬁgure for market capitalization/GDP
in Germany (35%) and connect it with the known change in nominal share prices
(−51.7%)andnominalGDP(−46%).Thissuggeststhatmarketcapitalization/GDP
should have been 26% in early 1933. Because our sample is equivalent to 12% of
GDP, this implies that the 0.71% of GDP change in market capitalization for
connected ﬁrms in the sample translates into 1.53% for the country’s stock market
as a whole.
63. Petzold (1995) provides an extensive discussion of the campaign funds;
older essays such as Hallgarten (1952) raise questions that may still require fur-
ther work. For IG Farben, see esp. NMT, 7 (1953).134 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
donated—and their relative return would have been commensu-
rately larger.
By international standards, the value of connections with the
Nazi party was unusually high. Comparison with the results of
Faccio (2006) suggests that in her sample of 47 countries from
around the globe, only Third World countries with poor gover-
nance showed similarly high returns. Also, associations with the
NSDAP were formed voluntarily, not through family links; also,
they were not in place decades before their political value became
apparent, as in many Third World countries. One question for
future research is how many of these connections turned out to
be valuable in the end and through which channels the party re-
warded its supporters.64 Though some businessmen felt that the
donationswerelarge,theirvaluewassmallcomparedtotherisein
stock market value of connected ﬁrms. Interestingly, even recently
formed afﬁliations such as those resulting from the fundraising
party in Berlin on February 20, 1933, appear to have boosted
ﬁrms’ fortunes on the stock market. Returns were not arbitraged
away by many other ﬁrms entering the fray. This suggests that
Hitler’s rise to power may have come as a genuine surprise to
many, that an ideological distaste for his party kept numerous
businessmen from contributing, or that NSDAP representatives
deliberately focused their attention on a subgroup of sympathetic
business contacts.
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